A new investigation has shown
how some Nigerian governors spend huge sums on technologies that enable them
decrypt telephone calls.
An investigation by
Premium Times has shown that Nigerian politicians have driven their illegal
surveillance and communication interception programs to new heights with the
acquisition of the latest tracking technology that allows them decrypt
telephone calls made over 3G networks in real time.
The technology could
also track the exact position of a user, even when abroad.
The politicians
implementing this new technology are old names in the game of illegal
surveillance. Emmanuel Uduaghan, former governor Delta state, got the
technology and handed over to his successor, Ifeanyi Okowa. Seriake Dickson of
Bayelsa who was involved in the Hacking Team scandal is also involved in this.
A Premium Times
investigation spanning months revealed that a Bulgarian digital surveillance
company, Circles 3G, offered the technology with which the governors secretly
violated the privacy of citizens, while federal government authorities,
themselves vulnerable, looked away.
The entrance of Circle
3G into Nigeria’s unregulated mass Internet surveillance market brings the
number of mass surveillance systems operational or tested in Nigeria to eight.
It also widens the range of Nigerians susceptible to surveillance and privacy
abuse by politicians.
Rivers state
Former Rivers State
Governor, Rotimi Amaechi, who is now Nigeria’s transport minister, was the
first Nigerian politician to demand a Circle 3G’s telephone tracking technology
as far back as 2010.
He requested the tool
the same year Nadezhda Edie-Petrova Ropleva established Circles. In an offer
letter dated 30 June 2010, and signed by the then Secretary to the State
Government, Sovens Okari, Rivers State Government invited V&V Limited to
supply the gadgets for N2.3 billion. The contract did not go through, however.
A breakdown in relationship between Mr. Amaechi and V&V Limited meant funds
were never released for the project.
When contacted, Mr.
Amaechi said he was unaware of the project. He argued that there was no record
of fund releases for the project.
Two years earlier, Mr.
Amaechi had picked up a similar gadget, the C4i (Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, and Intelligence) technology deployed by an Israeli
military security firm, MPD Systems. Mr. Amaechi had described the C4i as a
tool to aid federal security in combating militancy and kidnappings within the
state. But it was more than that. C4i was the perfect ‘federal’ cover under
which Amaechi’s political spying was carried out.
Delta state
Former Delta State
Governor, Emmanuel Uduaghan, holds the record of being the first Nigerian
politician to use the Circles 3G tools in Nigeria.
Mr. Uduaghan doled out
N1.5 billion state funds to sign up for the service in February 2012. He also
paid a yearly service fee of N31.9 million.
After Mr. Uduaghan
left office, he handed over the tools to the new governor, Ifeanyi Okowa, who
recently signed a two year contract to extend the maintenance of the service.
Although the police
headquarters in Abuja owns a Circles 3G communication interception service
which it pays N63 million annually to maintain, the Delta state government
argues its gadgets were bought for the police.
“My boss has no need
to monitor any politician,” Ehiedu Aniagu,
chief press secretary to Mr. Okowa said.
Premium Times
investigation shows that the gadgets are run by V & V Limited and employees
of the governor, rather than public security agents.
Bayelsa State
The Bayelsa State
Governor, Seriake Dickson, switched to Circles 3G’s services in July 2012, after
his contract with Italian Hacking Team failed to intercept as much as the
government wanted.
Mr. Dickson doled out
N1.7 billion to acquire Circles 3G’s service with an extra annual maintenance
fee of N31.9 million. The amount N1.7 billion is N200 million higher than what
his Delta State counterpart paid to the same firm.
The governors acquired
the tools without the requisite End User Certificates – a license issued by the
office of the National Security Adviser to entities seeking to import defence equipment.
In fact, individuals
are prohibited from handling such mass surveillance equipment. Only state
actors like the police are allowed by law to own them.
Several inquiries to
the Bayelsa State Government for comments were ignored. Text messages were not
replied to, and calls were not returned.
Why Circles 3G is Bad
in the Hands of Politicians
Circles can track the
exact position of 3G telephones in real time in almost any part of the world.
But that’s not the worst thing about Circles.
Circles is also able
to intercept calls and internet traffic in the 3G (UMTS) networks, a capability
that was before now impossible without the cooperation of the telephone
companies. Calls made over 3G networks are usually encrypted end to end while
the telephone companies held the decryption keys. Previous techniques relied on
compelling the targeted phone to switch from 3G to 2G which was easier to
decrypt in real time.
To get around the
problems associated with intercepting 3G mobile phone calls in real time,
Circles established a phone company in Bulgaria last year.
According to a report
by Intelligence Online, Circles, with its status as a network provider in
Bulgaria, obtains encryption keys by direct connections to the inter-operator
networks of Magyar Telekom, Telecom Italia and Cogent in the United States.
Circles’ connection with these three networks gives it access to decryption
keys held by mobile telephone companies all over the world.
Our investigations
show that in the run up to the December 2015 elections in Bayelsa, Mr. Dickson
used this spying tool to track his prime challenger, Timipriye Sylva. Mr.
Dickson did not stop at Sylva, he also tracked phone numbers belonging to Mr.
Sylva’s wife, aides and loyalists.
This piece of
technology was also deployed in hunting down Tonye Ekio who was incarcerated by
the governor, late 2013, over a Facebook post that was critical of Mr.
Dickson’s government.
An ex-militant,
Africanus Ukparasia, also known as “General Africa”, was also a target of Mr.
Dickson’s surveillance.
Although Circles sold
the technology to Mr. Dickson with an apparent understanding to use it within
his territory, the governor used it to eavesdrop on targets far away from
Bayelsa. For instance, some of the daily target reports seen by PremiumTimes
shows Mr. Dickson tracing Mrs. Sylva’s phone numbers to locations in Abuja.
Another report shows him tracing a target called E-Genle to a location outside
the country.
Mr. Dickson’s use of
his spying technology, bought with state funds, suggests he did not follow any
rule requiring that the privacy of individuals be respected. It also means
every politician, and anyone with a phone number, could be victim of the abuse.
It is not clear who
Delta state’s top politicians, Messrs Uduaghan and Okowa directed their
surveillance on, but PremiumTimes investigations found that this tool was
installed in the governor’s lodge, and not under the control of government
security services.
Ethically Wrong
The Nigerian
surveillance industry is loosely regulated. Participation is controlled by weak
laws.
While the United
Nations’ resolution on digital privacy recommends that any instance of
interference be subject to a careful and critical assessment of its necessity,
legitimacy and proportionality, none of these frameworks exist in Nigeria.
The Nigerian
cybercrime law which can be extended to restrain these politicians prescribes a
prison term of not more than two years, or a fine of N5 million or both for
convicts, making it possible for anyone with financial and political muscle to
acquire and use it in any dimension of interest.
The Muhammadu
Buhari-led administration does not appear to be concerned about regulating
Nigeria’s digital surveillance and interception market.
In an interview with
Premium Times, Femi Adesina, one of the president’s spokesperson, admitted that
discussions around the topic “has not come up at that level”.
Gbenga Sesan,
executive director of Paradigm Initiative Nigeria, said the first step would be
to subject all acquisition, deployment and reviews to judicial oversight through
mandatory court warrants.
“Nigeria does need a
defined framework for any surveillance activity to ensure that abuse doesn’t
continue as this case — and others like the Hacking Team engagement — have
shown,” Mr. Sesan said.
Mr. Sesan is currently
promoting a Digital Rights and Freedom Bill in the National Assembly. The bill,
which makes provisions for the control and regulation of surveillance and
lawful interception, has passed first reading in the House of Representatives.
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